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Photonic integrated circuits (PICs) provide a compact and stable platform for quantum photonics.
Here we demonstrate a silicon photonics quantum key distribution (QKD) transmitter in the first
high-speed polarization-based QKD field tests. The systems reach composable secret key rates of
950 kbps in a local test (on a 103.6-m fiber with a total emulated loss of 9.2 dB) and 106 kbps in an
intercity metropolitan test (on a 43-km fiber with 16.4 dB loss). Our results represent the highest
secret key generation rate for polarization-based QKD experiments at a standard telecom wave-
length and demonstrate PICs as a promising, scalable resource for future formation of metropolitan
quantum-secure communications networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) remains the only
quantum-resistant method of sending secret information
at a distance [1, 2]. The first QKD system ever de-
vised used polarization of photons to encode informa-
tion [3, 4]. QKD has since progressed rapidly to several
deployed systems that can reach point-to-point secret
key generation rates in the upwards of 100 kbps [5–8]
and to other photonic degrees of freedom: time [9–12],
frequency [13–16], phase [17], quadrature [18–21], and
orbital angular momentum [22]. While polarization re-
mains an attractive choice for free-space QKD due to
its robustness against turbulence [23–28], polarization is
commonly thought to be unstable for fiber-based QKD.
For this reason, there has been a strong interest in trans-
lating the polarization QKD components into photonic
integrated circuits (PICs), which provide a compact and
phase-stable platform capable of correcting for polariza-
tion drifts in the channel. Recently, silicon-based polar-
ization QKD transmitters were used for laboratory QKD
demonstrations [29, 30], but their performance advan-
tage over standard telecommunication components has
yet to be demonstrated. Here we report the first field
tests using high-speed silicon photonics-based transmit-
ter for polarization-encoded QKD.
The silicon photonics platform allows for the inte-
gration of multiple high-speed photonic operations into
a single compact circuit [31–34]. Operating at giga-
hertz bandwidth, a silicon photonics polarization QKD
transmitter can correct for polarization drifts with typ-
ical millisecond time scales in a metropolitan-scale fiber
link. Furthermore, silicon nanophotonic devices are com-
patible with the existing complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductor (CMOS) processes that have enabled
monolithic integration of photonics and electronics, pos-
sibly leading to future widespread utilization of QKD.
The QKD transmitter demonstrated here is manufac-
tured using a CMOS-compatible process. The trans-
mitter combines a 10-Gbps Mach-Zehnder Modulator
(MZM) with interleaved grating couplers, which convert
the polarization of a photon in an optical fiber into the
path the photon takes in the integrated circuit, and vice
versa. The high-speed polarization control is enabled
by electro-optic carrier depletion modulation within the
MZM [35]. We show the performance of the device in
a local field test and an intercity field test. With a
clock rate of 625 MHz, we generated secret keys at a
rate of 950 kbps and observed a bit error rate of 2%
in the local test between two neighboring buildings con-
nected by a 103.6 m fiber (with an additional 9 dB em-
ulated loss). In the 43 km (16.4 dB channel loss) inter-
city test between the cities of Cambridge and Lexington,
we generated secret keys at a rate of 106 kbps and ob-
served a bit error rate 2.8%. Both QKD operations are
demonstrated to be secure against collective attacks in
a composable security framework with a tight security
parameter of εsec = 10
−10. Our results demonstrate how
silicon photonics—supported by the currently existing
CMOS technology—can pave the way for a high-speed
metropolitan-scale quantum communication network.
RESULTS
Silicon photonics transmitter
Our QKD transmitter and its cross-section are shown
in Fig. 1(a–c). Light is coupled in and out of the
transmitter using a standard fiber v-groove array of
250 µm pitch. Owing to the large index contrast be-
tween the silicon layer and the buried oxide, the trans-
mitter is compact within a total area of 0.75× 1.5 mm2.
Polarization grating couplers are used to convert be-
tween polarization-encoding in the input/output fibers
and path-encoding within the PIC. The unitary trans-
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FIG. 1. (a) Optical micrograph of the silicon photonics transmitter, along with a scanning electron micrograph of the
polarization grating coupler. Only the inner three polarization grating couplers are parts of the transmitter operation; the
outer two couplers are present to help alignment with a fiber v-groove array. (b) Schematic diagram of the MZM transmitter.
The device uses two internal and two external electro-optic phase modulators, each of length 1.5 mm. (c) Schematic of the
cross-sectional layer stack of the transmitter. (d) Bloch sphere representation of the polarization states generated by the
transmitter as the internal (∆θ) and the external (∆φ) phase modulators are biased. (e–f) Polarization modulation with the
silicon photonics polarization modulator as measured in the two relevant bases. Polarization extinction ratio of more than
25 dB can be typically achieved. Negative voltage denotes reverse bias with regards to the doped p-i-n junction. Measurements
in the Z-basis and X-basis are shown in (e) and (f), respectively. (g) Eye diagram of 10 Gbps polarization modulation in the
Z-basis: on-state corresponds to |V 〉 and off-state corresponds to |H〉.
formation is similar to that of a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS). Within the PIC, the photons’ paths—and their
relative phases—are manipulated using an MZM with
two internal and two external electro-optic phase modu-
lators, which in turn manipulate the photon polarization
in the output fiber.
The input polarization grating coupler separates light
from the horizontal and vertical polarizations onto two
different paths, both in the transverse-electric (TE) po-
larization: with its electric field oscillating parallel to the
chip surface. Any light inadvertently converted into the
transverse-magnetic (TM) polarization in these waveg-
uides is greatly attenuated by the phase modulators
which strongly support higher transmission in TE po-
larization over TM polarization.
The electro-optic phase modulators in the MZM are
based on depletion-mode free-carrier dispersion from
a doped p-i-n junction superimposed on the optical
mode [36, 37]. The overlap between the optical mode
and the free carriers results in free carrier refraction [38],
which can be controlled with gigahertz RF signals to
achieve high-speed phase modulation.
The polarization states generated by the transmitter
have a purity of 1.000 ± 0.005, measured using a po-
larimeter. In Fig. 1(d), the relative phases of the internal
phase shifters (∆θ) as well as the relative phases of the
external phase shifters (∆φ) are swept with a reverse bias
voltage between 0 and 8 V. For this voltage range, the
polarization states lie on the surface of the Bloch sphere
indicating that they remain pure throughout.
The BB84 QKD protocol requires Alice to prepare
three quantum states: two eigenstates of Z and an eigen-
state of X [39, 40]. Alice randomly chooses the basis she
prepares in. When Z-basis is selected, Alice prepares ei-
ther |0z〉 = |H〉 or |1z〉 = |V 〉 with equal probabilities of
1/2. Otherwise, when X-basis is selected, Alice prepares
the state |0x〉 = |D〉 = (|H〉+ |V 〉)/
√
2.
We prepared the three quantum states at high fidelity,
as shown in Figs. 1(e–f), with a polarization extinction
ratio better than 25 dB which is required for low-error
QKD operations. The internal and external phase modu-
lators were configured to produce the state (|t〉+|b〉)/√2,
which we take to be |0z〉. RF signals of differing voltages
were applied to one of the external phase modulators to
generate (|t〉+ eiφ |b〉)/√2, where φ is the applied phase
shift. All the three BB84 states can be generated by
applying the phase shifts φ = 0, pi/2, and pi. The polar-
ization states were measured using a PBS followed by two
InGaAs photodiodes. A polarization controller before the
PBS allowed measurements in the two BB84 bases: the
Z-basis and the X-basis.
As shown in the eye diagram in Fig. 1(g), the phase
modulators allowed us to generate the polarization states
at 10 Gbps. These measurements were acquired by using
an in-line polarizer placed at the output of the trans-
mitter that converts the polarization state |V 〉 into an
on-state and the polarization state |H〉 into an off-state.
When the transmitter was modulated at 6 Gbps or lower,
not a single error was observed for a five-minute opera-
tion. At a 10 Gbps data rate, as shown here, we measured
a low error rate of 9.0× 10−10 s−1.
Field tests
We performed two QKD field tests: a local test and an
intercity test. Fig. 2 shows a map of the greater Boston
area, identifying the locations of Alice and Bob, together
with the experimental setups implementing the asym-
metric polarization-based BB84 protocol. Alice, located
in the Compton Laboratories at MIT for both field tests,
prepares the three polarization BB84 states at random.
Bob measures in either the Z-basis or the X-basis using
four superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs) at a different location for each field test. He
is located in the Fairchild Building for the local test and
at MIT Lincoln Laboratory in Lexington for the intercity
test. Bob makes his basis choices using the polarization
controller placed before each PBS.
Alice creates (non-phase randomized) attenuated laser
pulses of width 800 ps at 1480 nm with a 625 MHz repeti-
tion rate. The pulses are modulated into the three BB84
polarization states by the silicon photonics trasmitter.
Alice first calibrates for the polarization rotation through
the channel, and DC reverse voltage biases are applied
to the transmitter such that the state |D〉 is generated
by default. To generate the states |H〉 and |V 〉, Alice
applies synchronized RF pulses with a full-width-at-half-
maximum of 400 ps. To maximize the length of secret
keys generated, Alice chooses to prepare either in the Z-
basis with a probability of 15/16 (and in the X-basis with
a probability of 1/16).
In the local test, Alice sends her prepared states to
Bob through a 103.6 m fiber link connecting the two
laboratories. The loss through the link is 0.2 dB, and
we emulated longer fiber distances by installing a vari-
able optical attenuator before the channel. On the other
hand, the deployed intercity fiber connecting Cambridge
and Lexington is 43 km long with 16.4 dB loss.
Bob detects the pulses he receives in either of the two
bases with 50% probability to maximize the number of
security check events when the key-generating detectors
are saturated. For the local test, Bob uses four individ-
ual WSi SNSPDs, each with a quantum efficiency greater
than 85%, a timing resolution of ∼ 250 ps, and a back-
ground dark count rate of ∼ 1000 counts/s. For the in-
tercity test, Bob uses four NbN SNSPD systems, each
consisting of two interleaved NbN nanowires with a sin-
gle optical fiber input. A single NbN SNSPD system has
a quantum efficiency of 30%, a timing resolution of tens of
ps, and a background dark count rate of ∼ 1000 counts/s.
While the WSi nanowire has a better quantum efficiency
than the NbN system, the WSi detector saturates at a
lower count rate of 5× 106 counts/s.
Alice and Bob only generate secret keys when both
parties choose the Z-basis. The quantum bit error rate
ebit is measured by checking the number of bits that have
been flipped between their raw bit strings. On the other
hand, the quantum phase error rate ephase can be esti-
mated from X-basis events along with the mismatched
basis events, where Alice and Bob chose different prepa-
ration and measurement bases (see Methods) [39, 40].
An automated polarization feedback system is placed
in the intercity channel between Alice and Bob, which
can drift significantly on the timescale of the experiment.
To correct for the drift, Alice sends a series of calibration
signals and optimizes her DC voltage biases such that
the error rate on both measurement bases is kept low. As
seen in Fig. 2(b), the relative fluctuations of ebit (relative
to its starting value) are limited to 2% with feedback, and
to about 50% without feedback.
Composable secret key generation
Figure 3 shows the performance of the QKD transmit-
ter in both field tests, in terms of the observed secret key
rate (SKR), ebit, and ephase. For clarity, we plotted the
SKRs against the channel loss and the equivalent fiber
distance assuming an optimistic fiber loss of 0.2 dB/km.
We kept the number of pulses sent from Alice to Bob at
N = 2.81 × 1011 to maintain a uniform collection time
of 450 s for each experiment, and analyzed the security
with a small security parameter of εsec = 10
−10.
For the local test, at a total channel attenuation of
9.2 dB, we obtained a SKR of 950 kbps using mean pho-
ton numbers of 0.12, 0.012, 0.003 for the signal and the
two decoy states—chosen with probabilities 2/3, 2/9, and
1/9—respectively. The mean photon numbers were kept
low to avoid detector saturation. The total channel at-
tenuation was further increased from 9.2 dB to 24.2 dB to
simulate longer fiber distances. We observed an average
ebit of ∼ 2%, except for the lowest channel attenuation
where ebit is higher at 3.97% as the WSi detectors are
saturated. As expected from theoretical simulations, the
phase error rate ephase increased from 7.92% to 21.31%
as we increased the channel attenuation.
For the metropolitan intercity test, we obtained an
SKR of 106 kbps using mean photon numbers 0.5, 0.03,
0.015 for the signal and the decoy states with the same
probabilities as above. Here the mean photon numbers
could be chosen higher while being well under the NbN
detector systems’ saturation point. We observed an ebit
of 2.82% and an ephase of 13.29% in this 43 km experi-
ment.
FIG. 2. Aerial view of the intercity QKD field test. Alice is located at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in
Cambridge and Bob is located at MIT Lincoln Laboratory in Lexington. Although the point-to-point distance between the
two stations are ∼ 18 km, they are connected by a 43-km dark fiber link. Alice consists of an attenuated laser source, an
intensity modulator, and the silicon photonics polarization transmitter. Bob consists of two polarizing beam splitters (PBSs)
followed by four superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPDs). Insets: (a) Close-up aerial view of the local
QKD field test, where Alice and Bob are located in two adjacent MIT buildings connected by a 103.6 m deployed dark fiber
link. Alice and Bob’s setups are the same as the ones used in the intercity test. (b) Fluctuations on the bit error rate with
and without polarization feedback control, relative to the starting bit error rate. Imagery c©2017 Google. Map data: Google,
Landsat/Copernicus.
Reference
Clock rate λ Fiber distance Channel loss Secret key rate
Finite-key εsec Protocol Notes(MHz) (nm) (km) (dB) (kbps)
[41] 1000 850 4.2 9.24 130 Assumes asymptotic B92 Polarization, VCSELs
[42] 625 850 1 2.2 2100 Assumes asymptotic B92 Polarization, VCSELs
[29] 10 1550 – 0.0 0.95 Assumes asymptotic BB84 Polarization, Si PIC
[30] 1000 1550 20 4.0 329 Assumes asymptotic BB84 Polarization, Si PIC
[5] 1000 1550 50† 14.5 304 Assumes asymptotic BB84 Time-bin, long-term
[6] 1000
1547.72
22† 12.6 230 Assumes asymptotic BB84 Time-bin, long-term
1550.92
[7] 1000 1550 45† 14.5 300 10−10 BB84 Time-bin, long-term
This work 625 1480
0.1† + var. att. 9.2 950
10−10 BB84 Polarization, Si PIC
43† 16.4 106
TABLE I. Comparison of high-rate polarization-based QKD experiments and other high-rate discrete-variable QKD field tests.
Dagger (†) represents a deployed fiber link. VCSELS: vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers.
DISCUSSION
To illustrate the progress entailed by our results,
we summarize our work in Table I along with recent
demonstrations of high-speed polarization-based QKD.
Our work represents the highest observed SKR for any
polarization-based QKD operations at comparable chan-
nel losses, and it performs comparably to other state-
of-the-art QKD field demonstrations. It is also the
first demonstration of the asymmetric loss-tolerant BB84
QKD protocol with guaranteed security against collective
attacks [40]. The silicon photonics platform has enabled
FIG. 3. Top: Experimental SKRs at different channel losses.
The (blue) squares and upright triangles are asymptotic SKRs
for the local test and the 43 km metropolitan intercity test,
respectively. Similarly, the (red) circles and inverted trian-
gles are the SKRs calculated within the composable secu-
rity framework with εsec = 10
−10 for the local test and the
metropolitan field test, respectively. In the local tests, a vari-
able attenuator is used to provide higher attenuation beyond
the channel’s 0.2 dB loss. Solid and dashed lines correspond
to numerical simulations of the SKRs for the local test and
the intercity test, respectively. Bottom: Bit and phase error
rates against channel loss in the composable security frame-
work. The symbols used here are the same as the ones above.
us to design a compact transmitter with high-speed and
high-fidelity operations using a CMOS-compatible pro-
cess. This points to the possibility of low-cost and re-
silient QKD transmitters for metro-scale quantum-secure
networks.
PICs offer opportunities for further integration for
both the transmitter and the receiver and for closing
possible security flaws and side-channel attacks. Dense
wavelength-division multiplexing has been one major
thrust in classical communications, and a compact so-
lution is available in silicon photonics by using an array
of add-drop ring resonators [43, 44]. This scheme can
be integrated with our current QKD transmitter design
with only minimal changes in the footprint. Furthermore,
single photon detectors have been integrated into silicon
photonics [45], showing the possibility of a compact QKD
receiver.
Moreover, the configurability of the silicon photonics
platform allows for complex monitoring circuits that pro-
tect against side-channel attacks [46]. For example, a
Trojan horse attack can be thwarted by placing watch-
dog detectors in our transmitter [47, 48]. Possible de-
tector vulnerabilities, such as the detector blinding at-
tack [49, 50], can be eliminated using the measurement-
device-independent configuration [9, 51, 52].
In conclusion, we have demonstrated short-range and
metro-scale QKD field tests based on a silicon photonics
transmitter, reaching secret key rates of 950 kbps and
106 kbps, respectively. These are the first field tests us-
ing PIC-based QKD transmitters. The PIC platform pro-
vides a compact and phase-stable platform for high-speed
QKD that is well suited for further scaling by wavelength
division multiplexing.
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METHODS
Protocol Description
We consider an asymmetric three-state BB84 protocol.
In particular, Alice randomly selects to prepare a qubit
in either the Z-basis or the X-basis with probabilities
pAZ and p
A
X = 1 − pAZ , respectively. Similarly, Bob inde-
pendently and randomly chooses to measure in either of
the two bases with probabilities pBZ and p
B
X = 1 − pBZ .
In our experiments, pAZ = 15/16, p
A
X = 1/16, p
B
Z = 1/2,
and pBX = 1/2. The mean photon number of each laser
pulse in the experiment is chosen randomly from three
different settings: µ1, µ2, µ3. They satisfy the relation
µ1 > µ2 + µ3 and µ2 > µ3 ≥ 0.
1. Preparation: For each laser pulse, Alice ran-
domly chooses the mean photon number 〈N〉 ∈
{µ1, µ2, µ3} with probabilities pµ1 , pµ2 , and pµ3 =
1 − pµ1 − pµ2 , respectively. Alice then selects
the basis a ∈ {Z,X} with probabilities pAZ and
pAX = 1 − pAZ , respectively. If she has selected the
Z-basis, then she randomly sends either |0z〉 = |H〉
or |1z〉 = |V 〉 to Bob with equal probabilities. If
the X-basis was selected, she sends the |0x〉 = |D〉
to Bob. She records the bit value of the state she
has sent in x.
2. Measurement : Bob measures the signals he re-
ceived in the measurement basis b ∈ {Z,X} with
probabilities pBZ and p
B
X = 1 − pBZ , respectively.
Bob performs the measurements with four single-
photon detectors (one per basis). He then records
his measurement as one of the four possible out-
comes: {0, 1, ∅,⊥}. 0 and 1 are the bit values (H
and V in the Z-basis, and D and A in the X-basis),
∅ represents no detection, and ⊥ represents a dou-
ble detection. Bob records the outcome in y, and
he assigns a random bit value if a double detection
is observed.
3. Basis reconciliation and sifting : Alice and Bob an-
nounce their bases and intensity choices over an au-
thenticated public channel. They then place their
records into one of the following sets:
• Key-generation sets:
Zµ = {i|ai = bi = Z, 〈Ni〉 = µ, yi 6= ∅},
• Security-check sets:
Xµ = {i|ai = bi = X, 〈Ni〉 = µ, yi 6= ∅},
• Mismatched-basis sets:
ZjX kµ = {i|ai = Z, bi = X, 〈Ni〉 = µ,
xi = j, yi = k}.
Steps 1–3 are repeated until the size of each set has
reached a certain length previously agreed by both
parties. Alice and Bob generate a raw key pair
(ZA,ZB) by choosing a random sample from the
set Z = ∪µZµ. Following [53], we generate secret
keys from all intensity settings.
4. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob then com-
pute the bounds to the number of vacuum and
single-photon events within the set Z using the
security-check sets and the mismatched-basis sets.
Next, they estimate the number of phase errors
within the single-photon events, and check if the
phase error rate ephase is less than the prede-
termined threshold value ephase, tol. If ephase >
ephase, tol, then they abort the protocol, otherwise
they proceed.
5. Postprocessing : Alice and Bob perform error cor-
rection for (ZA,ZB) over their authenticated public
channel, revealing λEC bits. To verify that they
have identical secret keys, they compute a two-
universal hash function that publishes dlog2 1/εcore
bits. If the protocol passes all the above steps, they
then perform privacy amplification to extract a se-
cret key pair (KA,KB) with each key of length `
bits.
Security analysis
We consider the loss-tolerant asymmetric BB84 pro-
tocol in the composable security framework [39, 40]. A
QKD protocol is considered to be secure if it is both cor-
rect and secret. The protocol is secret when the pair
of keys KA and KB are identical except for some small
probability εcor, i.e. Pr [KA 6= KB ] = εcor. The proba-
bility εcor is determined by the failure probability of the
two-universal hash function. Furthermore, the protocol
is secret if the quantum state ρKAE that describes the
correlation between Alice’s key and Eve’s quantum sys-
tem is εsec-close to ωKA ⊗ ρE , where ωKA describes a
uniform distribution of all bit strings. In other words,
1
2
‖ρKAE − ωKA ⊗ ρE‖ ≤ εsec. (1)
Within this composable security framework, the secret
key length is
` ≥ ⌊mL0 +mL1 [1− h(eUphase)− ξh(ebit)]
− log2
4
ε2sec
− log2
2
εcor
⌋
,
(2)
where h is the binary entropy function, mL0 and m
L
1 are
the lower bounds to the number detections due to vac-
uum and single photons, respectively. eUphase is an upper
bound to the phase error rate, which can be computed
using the methods outlined in Ref. [40]. ebit is the quan-
tum bit error rate for the key-generating basis, and ξ
represents the error correction inefficiency—set at 1.15
for our calculations. For simplicity, we set all 17 fail-
ure probabilities related to estimating mL0 , m
L
1 , and the
number of phase errors Nφ as ε = ε
2
sec/17.
